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Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to compute and attribute mental states to oneself and 
other people. This study sought to assess the extent of differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in 
ToM processes, and, of particular importance, the key role of perspective-shifting between ‘Self’ and 
‘Other’. Utilizing a newly established false-belief paradigm in a matched design, healthy adult 
participants completed the task whilst behavioural measures (response times, error rates) and 
electrophysiological (EEG) recordings were taken. Results revealed that self-oriented belief-
attribution was faster and less error-prone than other-oriented belief-attribution, and demonstrated 
a key role of perspective-shifting. Perspective shifts from Self-to-Other resulted in longer response 
times and more errors than shifts from Other-to-Self. In contrast, no difference between self and 
other probes was found in no perspective-shift trials. Reflecting this, EEG recordings showed a 
significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type at an early onset across right 
parieto/occipito-lateral areas (250 ms post-stimulus onset), and across frontal-central areas from 
500 ms post-stimulus onset, indicating the key role of these areas in ToM engagement. Results 
demonstrate that ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ can be distinguished at a behavioural level, and highlight the 
critical role of ‘Perspective-Shifting’ in ToM processes. 
 
Keywords: theory of mind; social cognition; false-belief; perspective-shifting; belief-attribution 
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Everyday interaction and communication between individuals involves computation and attribution 
of various mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). These 
abilities, known as ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), allow us to understand and 
negotiate everyday life in an appropriate manner. Importantly, ToM capacities apply not only to 
understanding other people’s mental states, but also one’s own mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). The importance of ToM abilities is illustrated in cases of Autistic Spectrum Conditions (ASC), 
where atypical or reduced ToM capacities are often cited as a defining feature (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001; Brent et al., 2004; although see also Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004, and Gallese, 2006 for 
a counter-argument). In this paper, we examine, firstly, the extent to which ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
processes can be distinguished within the ToM mechanism and, secondly, the role of ‘Perspective-
Shifting’ in ToM processes.  
Many past studies examining ToM have focused on how individuals may compute and understand 
the mental states of other people (e.g. Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). More 
recently, there has been additional focus on how individuals reflect on and understand their own 
mental states (e.g. Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012). A key 
question arising from this research is whether the same neural mechanisms are involved in both 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’ mental state attribution, or whether these are two separate and distinct capacities, 
each relying on different cognitive components (Happé, 2003). Vogeley et al. (2001) comment that 
the extent to which ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ overlap in ToM is currently unclear, although they suggest that 
understanding of the ‘Self’ may be a necessary prerequisite to allow understanding of another 
individual’s mind; this suggestion is further supported by Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich 
(2004), who argue that in order to adopt another person’s perspective, individuals initially use the 
egocentric perspective as an ‘anchor’, adjusting their perspective-taking accordingly to allow 
consideration of the perspective of another person. Gallagher and Zahavi (2012) comment that it 
remains an ongoing debate as to whether understanding of the ‘self’ is a prerequisite for 
understanding of other people, suggesting distinct mechanisms, or whether ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
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understanding is one-and-the-same, utilizing the same cognitive mechanisms. Further, it is as yet to 
be ascertained how it is that individuals switch between perspectives of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’; is this an 
automatic, implicit process, or is it costly, requiring extra cognitive effort? (e.g. Saxe et al., 2006; 
McCleery et al., 2011). 
One of the first tasks assessing differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in ToM was an unexpected 
contents task – the ‘Smarties’ task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). In the task, children aged 3-5 
years are asked what they think is inside a sweets tube. On replying with ‘sweeties’/‘chocolate’, 
children are shown that the tube actually contains a pencil. With the pencil then re-hidden, children 
are asked what they had thought to be in the tube, before seeing inside (self-oriented question), and 
additionally what a friend, who has not seen inside the tube, would think was inside (other-
oriented). From 4-years-old, children reliably and consistently pass both the Self and Other oriented 
questions, correctly noting that they (and their friend) believed there to be sweets in the tube, even 
though they now know it contains a pencil. However, prior to 4-years-old, children tend to not only 
misrepresent the mental states of their friend (‘My friend would think there was a pencil inside’) but 
also their own previous mental states (‘I thought there was a pencil’). These results suggest that the 
ability to identify the mental states of both oneself and other people develop at the same time (i.e., 
our own minds are not understood first, leading to understanding of other people’s minds, or vice 
versa). This could imply that mental state attribution recruits the same cognitive mechanisms, 
regardless of whether considering the ‘Self’ or ‘Other’. 
An issue with the Smarties task, however, was that the ‘Self’ question could potentially be passed 
without false-belief competence, with children simply recalling what they had previously verbally 
identified as the contents of the tube (‘sweeties’), before they were shown the pencil (Williams & 
Happé, 2009). To address this, Williams and Happé (2009) conducted a revised unexpected contents 
task, the ‘Plasters’ task, in which explicit verbalization of the mental states was removed; children 
were asked to pass the experimenter a plaster, and in selecting the box they believed to contain the 
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plaster (from a choice of three boxes, only one of which was correct), a belief-state was established 
without requiring verbalisation. Whilst results were consistent for typically developing children, with 
equal performance on Self/Other-oriented trials, results for children with ASC showed that they 
performed significantly less well on Self-oriented questions than on Other-oriented test questions. 
These results indicate that individuals with ASC have greater difficulty representing their own beliefs 
than the beliefs of other people. Results such as these suggest that ‘Self’ versus ‘Other’ mental state 
attribution may rely upon two separate, albeit likely overlapping, neural mechanisms. 
Further supporting this differentiation, recent studies on healthy adults’ ToM abilities have 
suggested that individuals adopt an egocentric view of the world, failing to consider the perspective 
of another individual unless explicitly motivated to do so (e.g., Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017; 
Epley et al., 2004; Ferguson et al., 2015; Keysar et al., 2000). In contrast, Samson et al. (2010) 
suggest that the mere presence of a secondary agent can influence adult’s performance on a given 
task; for instance, using a visual perspective taking paradigm, Samson and colleagues showed that 
participants were slower to report the number of dots visible in a room when a secondary agent (an 
avatar) could not see all the dots that the participant could see. Samson et al. suggest that these 
results indicate that participants are tracking the other agent’s perspective automatically, despite it 
not being task relevant, maintaining an awareness that others may have different knowledge states 
from the ‘self’ perspective. However, it is noted that there is much debate in literature regarding 
whether the visual perspective taking paradigm is measuring ‘social’ perspective-taking per se, or 
perhaps is driven by more domain-general attentional cues, such as directional cues of the avatar 
(e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2014; Catmur et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017). Given these mixed findings, 
it currently remains unclear to what extent there is a differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in 
mentalising processes, and, crucially, how it is that an individual may alternate between each of 
these perspectives. The ability to smoothly switch between one’s own and other people’s 
perspectives – or to hold both egocentric and altercentric perspectives in mind concurrently (e.g., 
Samson et al., 2010) – plays a critical role in successful communication, allowing understanding of 
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another person’s viewpoint, their current knowledge states, and how these may compare to one’s 
own current state. 
The present study attempts to explore how efficiently individuals are able to consider their own and 
other people’s mental states using a computerised belief-attribution task. Participants are asked to 
answer simple dilemma questions from either their own or another person’s perspective (e.g. ‘[You 
are/Joe is] looking for some sugar. Where would [you/Joe] look?’), before a true (sugar in the sugar 
jar) or false (marbles in the sugar jar) belief-state outcome is revealed. Participants are then asked to 
attribute a belief (probe stage), again from either their own or another person’s perspective (e.g. 
‘What did [you/Joe] think was in the jar before seeing inside?’). In some trials, the perspective 
participants are asked to respond from (Self/Other) changes across the dilemma and probe stages, 
thus creating a perspective-shifting scenario (Self-to-Other and Other-to-Self). These trials allow us 
examine the extent to which being asked to respond from either the Self or Other perspective can 
influence outcomes, and also, of particular interest, the impact of a requirement to shift perspective 
from Self-to-Other or Other-to-Self. 
A recent study (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015), using this Self/Other Differentiation Task, 
revealed an interesting and surprising effect of perspective-shifting; results demonstrated that when 
shifting from Self-to-Other across a trial, performance was slower and less accurate than when 
shifting from Other-to-Self. In contrast, when no perspective-shift was required within a trial (Self-
to-Self/Other-to-Other), there was no difference in performance (response time/error rates) 
between trial types. It is suggested that these results may reflect the role of the ‘Self’ in acting as the 
stem for understanding the ‘Other’; the self-perspective is always processed, regardless of ultimate 
task demands, whereas the other-perspective is only processed when explicitly required. Thus, it 
would be more costly to switch from Self-to-Other, as the ‘other’ would not have been considered 
until required at the final stage of a trial, than it would be to switch from Other-to-Self, where the 
‘self’ may have been processed as a means of understanding the ‘other’, thus simply requiring recall 
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of a previous belief-state (Bradford et al., 2015). This effect seems stable and is present across 
cultures, as recently shown in a cross-cultural study comparing Western and Chinese participants 
(Bradford et al., 2018).  Furthering these findings, a recent study by Ferguson et al. (2017) used a 
level 1 visual perspective taking task (akin to Samson et al’s (2010) paradigm) to assess the role of 
perspective shifting in this paradigm; results showed that, whilst a requirement to shift between the 
‘self’ and ‘other’ perspective did not influence accuracy, participants were faster to respond in trials 
in which no perspective-shift was required compared to trials that did require a perspective-shift, 
suggesting that perspective-shifting itself is cognitively effortful.   
The aim of the current paper was to further explore this perspective-shifting effect using the 
Self/Other Differentiation Task, further examining the differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
within the ToM mechanisms, whilst seeking to investigate the timing and locations of the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of ToM processes using electrophysiological (EEG) measures. By using 
EEG measures, we sought to identify some of the neural correlates that may be supporting social 
cognition abilities and to identify temporal aspects of ToM processing in the brain. Amodio and Frith 
(2006) comment that there is currently only limited research that has studied the neural substrates 
underlying social cognition, and in focusing on methodologies assessing this, we may be better able 
to identify the unique, shared and coordinated roles of various neural structures in successful ToM 
engagement, particularly in healthily functioning adults.  
There are currently relatively few studies that have used Event Related Potentials (ERPs) to study 
ToM in the brain, with some key exceptions; for instance, Meinhardt et al. (2011) conducted a study 
exploring true- and false-belief reasoning using ERPs. In their study, children and adult participants 
were presented with cartoon stories in which a true and false-belief scenario was created. Results 
revealed both a late positive complex and late anterior slow wave, which Meinhardt et al. suggested 
were associated with the neural responses of the ‘decoupling mechanism’ required for false-belief 
understanding. These results support the findings of Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman’s (2009) 
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study in which adults and children completed a task in which they were required to reason about a 
character’s beliefs in a series of animated vignettes; results demonstrated a frontal late slow wave 
that was only seen in participants who were able to correctly engage in false-belief reasoning, 
compared to participants who failed the false-belief reasoning task. Finally, Sabbagh et al.(2009) 
conducted a study in which pre-school children completed a battery of representational ToM tasks 
whilst EEG data was recorded; results showed that individual differences in the dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) and the right temporal-parietal junction (rTPJ) were positively associated 
with ToM task performance, suggesting a critical role in ToM development. However, whilst these 
prior studies have revealed differences in how true- and false-belief state scenarios may be 
processed, in the current study, we sought to explore potential differentiations between how ‘self-
oriented’ or ‘other-oriented’ belief-states are processed.  
Beyond studies using EEG/ERP measures, there have been some previous attempts to locate ToM in 
the brain using functional brain-imaging measures, and results have revealed various suggestions for 
where ToM processing may occur, including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex, medial posterior parietal cortex (mPPC), and the bilateral temporal parietal 
junction (TPJ) (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Happé, 2003; Mahy, Moses & Pfeifer, 2014; Mitchell, Macrae, 
& Banaji, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Gallagher et al., 2000; Schurz et al., 2014; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003). A meta-analysis of functional brain-imaging studies by Schurz et al. (2014) suggested a core 
ToM network that involves both the mPFC and the TPJ. Amodio and Frith (2006) suggested a unique 
role of the medial frontal cortex in relation to social cognition, particularly in terms of differentiation 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and, even more specifically, differentiating between similar and dissimilar 
‘others’, suggesting separate processing of these capacities as well. Some research has further 
attempted to identify the specific roles different brain regions may play in ToM processing; for 
instance, prior studies have suggested that parietal areas, including the temporal-parietal cortex 
(Happé, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014) or posterior cingulate cortex (Gobbini et al., 2007; McCleery et al., 
2011), may be involved in the disengagement of the ‘self’ perspective and adoption of the ‘other’ 
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perspective. McCleery et al. (2011), using a visual-perspective taking task, suggested that the 
posterior cortex (specifically, the temporo-parietal cortex) is responsible for the calculation and 
representation of ‘Self’ vs. ‘Other’ perspectives, with the right frontal cortex later recruited to aid 
resolution of conflicting perspectives. It has also been suggested that frontal areas such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex (Gobbini et al., 2007) and the pre-frontal cortex (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Gallagher et al., 2000) may play a role in managing, or reconciling, contrasting perspectives (Saxe et 
al., 2006; Samson et al., 2005). However, previous studies have often relied on either comparing 
neural activity across ToM and non-ToM paradigms (e.g. false-beliefs versus false-photographs tasks; 
Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000) or have focused on attribution of beliefs to other people rather than the 
self (e.g., Gobbini et al., 2007; Gallagher et al., 2000), reducing the opportunity to directly compare 
abilities across these conditions, and to explore the process of shifting between perspectives. 
Given these prior findings, our ERP analysis will focus on selected key areas of interest – central 
parietal areas and frontal-central areas – as well as exploring the presence of potential hemispheric 
lateralized effects, across frontal-lateral and parieto/occipito-lateral areas (McCleery et al., 2011; 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe et al., 2009). Given the exploratory nature of our 
ERP analysis, these focus areas were chosen based upon suggestions from prior literature about the 
key roles that these broad areas play in ToM processes, in particular the role of representation and 
reconciliation of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ perspectives (e.g. Amodio & Frith, 2006; Happé, 2003; Saxe et al., 
2006; McCleery et al., 2011; Schurz et al., 2014; Gobbini et al., 2007). A key strength of the 
Self/Other Differentiation Task is the use of a matched-design, in which ‘self’ and ‘other’ oriented 
conditions, including perspective-shift trials, are matched to allow direct comparison of performance 
in each of these trial types. In utilizing the Self/Other Differentiation task, the current study sought 
to establish whether ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ belief-attribution processes could be distinguished in healthy 
adults, and the effect of shifting perspectives between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, using behavioural and EEG 
measures that allow direct comparison of the neural and cognitive requirements, and time-course, 
of these different capacities within the ToM mechanism. 
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It is predicted that trials which require participants to adopt the ‘Other’ perspective will be 
significantly slower and less accurate than trials in which the ‘Self’ perspective is required, 
supporting the idea that the ‘self’ is processed first, or more automatically, before the ‘other’ 
perspective is considered – or even that these two capacities are entirely dissociable, independently 
relying on different brain regions, with ‘other’ processing more demanding than ‘self’ processing, 
requiring extra cognitive resources that may lead to longer and more error prone processing. It is 
hypothesised that trials in which Perspective-Shifting is required (Other-to-Self/Self-to-Other) will be 
more difficult than those in which no perspective-shift is required (Self-to-Self/Other-to-Other), 
requiring more cognitive effort to switch to a different perspective than to maintain a perspective in 
no-shift trials. Importantly, it would be expected that trials in which a participant is required to 
switch from Self-to-Other would be significantly slower and more error prone than trials in which 
they are required to switch from Other-to-Self, as, in the latter, the ‘Self’ will have been processed 
egocentrically, to act as a ‘stem’ for understanding the ‘Other’ perspective, whereas in the former, 
there will have been no need to engage in any extra cognitive processing until explicitly required to 
do so at the probe stage.  
Our ERP analysis, based on prior research suggestions, will focus on central-parietal areas and 
frontal-central areas, as well as frontal-lateral and parieto/occipito-lateral areas to explore the 
presence of potential lateralized effects (e.g. Happé, 2003; McCleery et al., 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Gobbini et al., 2007; Geng & Vossel, 2013). It is expected that these key areas will 
demonstrate significant differences in amplitudes mirroring behavioural results; that is, a 
differentiation between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ oriented trials, as well as the role of perspective-shifting in 
ToM abilities, reflecting differences in the processing of these different trial types. Due to the 
exploratory nature of this analysis, and limited prior research directly comparing ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
oriented processing or the role of perspective-shifting, whilst an explicit differentiation between 
these components was predicted in our ERP analysis, the direction of these effects was not 
hypothesized. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Thirty-six adult participants (26 females, 10 males; mean age 22.1 years, range 17-51 years), who all 
either spoke English as their first language, or were fluent in English, took part in this study. 
Participants received a small honorarium of £5 per hour as compensation for time spent 
participating. One participant (male) was excluded due to a computer fault (failure to record data), 
thus thirty-five participants completed the study in total. To ensure homogeneity of the sample 
group for analysis, one further participant was excluded from analysis (female, 51 years). This meant 
that the total sample size for analysis was thirty-four adult participants (25 females, 9 males; mean 
age 21.03 years, range 17-30 years). All participants gave informed consent and this study was 
approved for use in human subjects in accordance with the University of St Andrews Research Ethics 
committee. 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch cathode ray tube (CRT) monitor. EEG data was recorded in a 
Faraday cage; the computer monitor was outside of the cage, visible through a window in the 
shielded booth, with a viewing distance of 80 cm. A keyboard was used to record responses, with 
the three arrow keys (←↓→) assigned as answer keys (the position of the key corresponded to the 
spatial location of answer stimuli – see ‘procedure’). Coloured images were presented on a white 
background, in the centre of the screen. Questions were presented in black text. 
A BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system with 70 Ag/AgCl electrodes was used to record 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity. Two additional electrodes, the Common Mode Sense (CMS) 
active electrode and Driven Right Leg (DRL) passive electrode, were used as reference and ground 
electrodes, respectively. Electrodes were mounted on an elastic cap. The two-electrode CMS/DRL 
feedback loop calculates and equates the average potential of each participant (the Common Mode 
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voltage) to the reference voltage of the Analog-to-Digital Conversion apparatus; EEG was acquired at 
the scalp electrode in ‘raw’ mode, relative to this reference voltage drawn from the CMS electrode, 
bringing the average potential of each participant as close as possible to the amplifier ground and 
reducing noise levels (Sysoeva, Lange, Sorokin & Campbell, 2015; Grimm, Roeber, Trujillo-Burreto, & 
Schröger, 2006; Campbell, Kerlin, Bishop, & Miller, 2012). The use of active electrodes removed the 
need for skin preparation (e.g. abrasion). Horizontal eye-movements were monitored by electrodes 
placed on the outer canthi of each eye, whilst vertical eye movements were monitored by electrodes 
placed beneath each eye. EEG recordings were sampled at 256 Hz. Off-line all EEG channels were 
recalculated to average reference. Trials containing blinks and horizontal eye movements were 
corrected using the adaptive artefact correction method of Brain Electromagnetic Source Analysis 
(BESA) software (Ille, Berg & Scherg, 2002). 
Procedure 
Participants were first prepared for EEG recording outside of the testing booth (electrode 
application). They were then taken into a testing booth, and seated in front of a computer screen in 
a dark room.  
In contrast to our previous study (Bradford et al., 2015), here the Self/Other Differentiation Task was 
programmed in ERTS (Experimental Run Time System) rather than in E-Prime, and the number of 
experimental trials included was increased. The task consisted of 8 practice trials and 216 test trials, 
with each trial consisting of three stages: dilemma stage, contents revelation stage, and probe stage. 
Both the practice and test trials followed the same format (dilemmacontentsprobe), but only 
test trials required belief-attribution. Table 1 provides details of trial types and the number of trials 
in each condition; Figure 1 provides an example of the time course of a single trial. 
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Table 1: Number of trials in each condition combination of the Self/Other Differentiation Task. Distracter trials 
refer to probe stage questions that do not require belief-attribution (e.g., ‘What colour was the sugar bowl?’) 
included to reduce participants anticipation of the correct answer in critical probe questions. 
 Self Dilemma Other Dilemma  
 Self Probe Other Probe Distracter Self Probe Other Probe Distracter Total 
Expected 
Contents 
17 17 20 17 17 20 108 
Unexpected 
Contents 
17 17 20 17 17 20 108 
Total 34 34 40 34 34 40 216 
 
Dilemma Stage – to create a belief state, participants were asked where they would look for a 
specific object, indicating their answer through selection of an appropriate container from three 
images presented in a horizontal line. Dilemmas could be either self-oriented (‘You are looking for a 
biscuit to eat. Where would you look?’) or other-oriented (‘Jane is looking for a biscuit to eat. Where 
would she look?’). In practice trials, participants were asked to select a specific object (e.g. ‘Select the 
backpack’). Dilemma questions were shown alone for 1500 ms, before image answer options were 
also displayed, for a maximum of 5000 ms. If participants selected an incorrect answer/failed to 
indicate an answer, an ‘X’ was displayed for 1500 ms before the correct answer was revealed at the 
contents revelation stage. 
Contents Revelation Stage – contents of a container could be either expected (true belief) or 
unexpected (false belief). Contents were shown for 2000 ms and did not require a response. 
Following self/other oriented dilemmas, half of each were followed by expected contents, and half 
by unexpected contents. In practice trials, contents was always expected (e.g. folders in the 
backpack). 
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Figure 1: Schematic example of the presentation sequence across a single trial in the Self/Other 
Differentiation task, starting with the Dilemma Question, followed by Contents Revelation, and 
finally the Probe Question. For this example, the comparative Self/Other conditions are presented 
together (You want/Jack wants). Trials could either involve no perspective shift (Self-Self, Other-
Other), or a perspective shift between the dilemma and probe stage (Self-Other, Other-Self). 
 
 
Probe Stage – used to assess belief-attribution abilities, the probe could be either self-oriented or 
other-oriented. Participants were asked to identify what either they themselves or another person 
believed to be in the container, before they saw inside. Answers were indicated by selection of one 
image from three presented in a horizontal line. Distracter questions were also included at the probe 
stage (e.g. ‘What colour was the wallet?’) to reduce participant’s ability to anticipate the correct 
answer until after seeing the probe question. The probe question was displayed for 1500 ms before 
the three answer options were revealed. Image answer options were displayed until response, or for 
a maximum of 8000 ms, if no response was recorded. In practice trials, participants were asked to 
select the picture that showed what had been in the container (i.e. reality/true belief). 
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Response times were recorded at both dilemma and probe stages. ERP analysis focused on neural 
responses to the probe question. To create the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ comparable conditions, sentences 
at both the dilemma and probe stages were matched in terms of syntax and syllables, so that each 
sentence had at least one paired match in the opposite condition (Self vs. Other). In the ‘Other’ 
conditions, all names used were one syllable, ensuring the length of sentences was not altered. A 
fixation cross (+) was displayed for 1000ms between trials.  
Analysis of Behavioural Responses 
Response times and error rates were assessed for responses to both the Dilemma Stage and Probe 
Stage of the Self/Other Differentiation Task, to assess differentiation in performance (i.e., speed and 
accuracy) between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ oriented trials. Prior to analysis, data was screened for outliers 
in overall reaction times by removing response times that were outside of three standard deviations 
from the overall reaction time mean. At both the Dilemma and Probe Stage, response times were 
time-locked to the onset of the three answer image options (i.e., once a participant was able to 
provide a response). Responses to the dilemma question were analysed using a paired samples t-
test, comparing responses to ‘self’ and ‘other’ oriented dilemmas. Responses to the probe question 
were analysed by taking into account whether there was a shift of perspective between Dilemma 
Type and Probe Type. For trials in which there was no perspective shift, both the Dilemma and Probe 
addressed either the self (Self-Self) or the other (Other-Other). For trials in which there was a 
perspective shift between Dilemma and Probe stages, the shift could be from either ‘self’ at the 
dilemma stage to ‘other’ at probe stage (Self-Other), or from ‘other’ to ‘self’ (Other-Self). To analyse 
the probe question responses, a 2 (Perspective Shift: No Shift vs. Shift) x 2 (Contents: Expected vs. 
Unexpected) x 2 (Probe: Self vs. Other) Repeated-Measures ANOVA was conducted.  
EEG Recording and Analysis 
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Trials with incorrect, missing, too slow (over three standard deviations from overall reaction time 
mean), or too fast (below 100 ms) responses, or with EEG artefacts (e.g., amplifier blocking, scalp 
muscular activity, and slow linear drift) were excluded from the ERP data analysis. ERP data was 
analysed in epochs locked to the onset of the probe question (Question-locked ERPs) and the probe 
answer options (Answer-Option-locked ERPs) (see also Figure 1). Analysis epochs lasted for 1200ms, 
starting 200ms before the onset of the probe question (for Question-locked ERPs) or probe answer 
options (for Answer-locked ERPs). 
Regions of Interest 
Four exploratory regions of interest analysis were defined, with focus electrode groups selected for 
analysis based on suggestions from prior research (e.g., Hartwright et al., 2012; McCleery et al., 
2011; Schurz et al., 2014; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) and visual inspection of the topographic maps, 
which indicated the locus of the sites of maximal effects (see Figures 3 and 4). The two broad regions 
of interest selected were: fronto-central areas (electrodes F1, FZ, F2, FC1, FCz, and FC2) and parieto-
central areas (electrodes CP1, P1, CPz, PZ, P2, and CP2). We were also interested in the lateralization 
of any potential effects, exploring potential hemisphere differences throughout effects; thus, 
analysis also looked at fronto-lateral areas (electrodes F5, FC5, F7, FT7, F6, FC6, F8, and FT8), and 
parieto/occipito-lateral areas (electrodes O1, PO3, PO7, P7, P5, P9, O2, PO4, PO8, P6, P8, and P10).  
Values were measured as mean amplitudes in subsequent 50ms intervals, from 150ms to 750ms 
post-stimulus presentation, using a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline. Similar to the analysis of the 
behavioural data at probe stage, frontal-central and parietal-central ERP amplitudes were subjected 
to 2 (Perspective Shift: No Shift vs. Shift) x 2 (Contents: Expected vs. Unexpected) x 2 (Probe: Self vs. 
Other) Repeated-Measures ANOVAs. For analysis of frontal-lateral and parieto/occipito-lateral ERP 
amplitudes, an additional factor of hemisphere (left vs. right) was included. 
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To reduce the possibility of Type 1 errors in the comparisons in the analysis, we have constrained 
our analysis in two ways. First, given that our main research interest was to explore the neural 
correlates of the probe x perspective-shift effect, we will only report significant results that include 
an interaction between shift and probe. Second, we will only consider results as significant if for a 
given effect p-values smaller than 0.05 are found in at least three subsequent time windows. Table 2 
presents F values for ERPs time-locked to the Probe Question onset, and Table 3 presents F values 
for ERPs time-locked to the Probe Answer-Options onset (see Figure 1). 
RESULTS 
Behavioural Data: Response Times (RT) and Error Rates 
For response times, only responses to correct trials were analysed. Accuracy was overall very high; 
for the dilemma stage, an average of 2.2% trials were removed per participant, whilst for the probe 
stage, an average of 3.9% trials were removed per participant. Response times were time-locked to 
the onset of the three answer option images. 
Dilemma Stage 
A paired-samples t-test revealed no significant difference in RT, t (33) = -1.72, p = .10, r = .24, or 
error rates, t (33) = .40, p = .69, r = .09 between Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented dilemma 
questions, M (RT) = 1279 vs. 1311 ms; M (Error Rate) = 2.29 vs. 2.12 %. 
Probe Stage 
A 2 (Perspective Shift: No Shift vs. Shift) x 2 (Contents: Expected vs. Unexpected) x 2 (Probe Type: 
Self vs. Other) Repeated-Measures ANOVA was conducted on RT data and error rates. Figure 2 
depicts mean RTs and error rates in response to the probe question in the Self/Other Differentiation 
task. 
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Results revealed a significant main effect of Probe Type, with faster, F (1, 33) = 26.38, p < .001, ƞp2 = 
.44, and more accurate, F (1, 33) = 22.81, p < .001, ƞp2 = .41, responses to self-oriented probes (830 
ms; 2.90% errors) than other-oriented probes (922 ms; 4.93% errors). A significant main effect of 
Perspective-Shifting was present, with faster, F (1, 33) = 5.07, p = .03, ƞp2 = .13, and more accurate, F 
(1, 33) = 15.06, p < .001, ƞp2 = .31, responses in no perspective-shift trials (859 ms; 3.16% errors) 
than in perspective-shift trials (892 ms; 4.67% errors). A main effect of Contents Type showed that 
responses were faster, F (1, 33) = 65.18, p < .001, ƞp2 = .66, and more accurate, F (1, 33) = 124.30, p < 
.001, ƞp2 = .79, following expected contents trials (824 ms; 1.34% errors) than unexpected contents 
trials (928 ms; 6.49% errors). 
Importantly, and replicating previous behavioural results (Bradford et al., 2015), there was a 
significant interaction between Perspective Shift and Probe Type, for both RT, F (1, 33) = 23.03, p < 
.001, ƞp2 = .41, and error rates, F (1, 33) = 7.53, p = .01, ƞp2 = .19. This interaction was due to a larger 
Probe Type effect (Other-Oriented Probes minus Self-Oriented Probes) in perspective shift trials (153 
ms; 3.53% errors) than in no perspective-shift trials (30 ms; 0.96% errors). In other words, within 
perspective-shift conditions, it was harder (taking longer, t (33) = -6.72, p < .001, r = .75, and with 
more errors, t (33) = -5.48, p < .001, r = .69) to shift from Self-to-Other than from Other-to-Self (see 
Figure 2). In no perspective-shift conditions, there was no significant difference in RT, t (33) = -1.41, 
p = .17, r = .27, or error rates, t (33) = -1.61, p = .12, r = .32, between Self-to-Self trials and Other-to-
Other trials (see Figure 2). 
There was also a significant interaction between Perspective Shift and Contents Type for RT, F (1, 33) 
= 15.67, p = .001, ƞp2 = .32, and error rates, F (1,33) = 4.20, p = .05, ƞp2 = .11. This was due to a larger 
effect of Contents Type on RT (Unexpected minus Expected) in no perspective shift conditions (164 
ms), compared to perspective shift conditions (43 ms). For error rates, there was a larger effect of 
Contents Type in perspective shift conditions (6.4% errors) compared to no perspective shift 
conditions (3.89% errors). 
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Figure 2: Mean response time in milliseconds (top graph) and error rates (percentages; lower graph) for the 
different conditions of the Self/Other Differentiation Task, reflecting responses to the probe question. Error 
bars denote +/- 2 Standard Errors. 
 
For error rates, there was a significant interaction between Contents Type and Probe Type, F (1, 33) 
= 29.15, p < .001, ƞp2 = .47, due to a larger effect of contents type (Unexpected minus Expected) for 
other-probes (7.09% errors) than for self-probes (3.20% errors). 
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between Perspective Shift, Contents Type, and 
Probe Type for both RT, F (1, 33) = 8.64, p = .006, ƞp2 = .21, and error rates, F (1, 33) = 10.75, p = .002, 
ƞp2 = .25. Post-hoc analysis of RT suggested that this was because an interaction between 
perspective shift and probe type was only present for expected contents trials, F (1, 33) = 36.35, p < 
.001, ƞp2 = .52, but not for unexpected contents trials, F (1, 33) = .83, p = .37, ƞp2 = .03. In contrast, 
for error rates, this interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe-Type was present only in 
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unexpected contents conditions, F (1, 33) = 8.13, p = .007, ƞp2 = .20, and not for expected contents 
conditions, F (1, 33) = .81, p = .37, ƞp2 = .02. No other effects were significant (all p values > .05). 
 
Electrophysiological Data 
For analysis of the ERP data, only trials with correct responses were included. ERP analysis focused 
on two separate time points: (1) the onset of the probe question (Probe-Question locked ERPs) and 
(2) the onset of the probe answer options (Probe-Answer locked ERPs). 
Probe-Question Locked ERPs 
A significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type was present from 500 – 
750ms after the presentation of the answer question across fronto-central areas, Fs (1, 33) ≥ 4.40, ps 
≤ .044, ƞp2s ≥ .12 (see Table 2 for details). This significant interaction was due to a larger negative 
difference in amplitude (for interval 600-650ms) between ‘No-Perspective Shift’ and ‘Perspective-
Shift’ trials for ‘Other’ oriented probes (-0.91 μV) than for ‘Self’ oriented probes (0.27 μV). 
A significant three-way interaction between Hemisphere, Perspective Shifting, and Probe Type was 
seen across parieto/occipito-lateral areas from 250 – 500 ms, Fs (1, 33) ≥ 4.17, ps ≤ .049, ηp2s ≥ .11 
(see also Table 2). This was due to the significant interaction between Perspective Shifting and Probe 
Type being present only in the right hemisphere, but not in the left hemisphere. Figure 3 illustrates 
this effect. 
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Figure 3: To show the significant Hemisphere*Shift*Probe interaction, ERP Waveforms are 
presented for the left hemisphere (left panels; electrode PO7) and separately for the right 
hemisphere (right panels; electrode PO8), with no perspective-shift trial conditions illustrated in the 
upper panels (Self-Self and Other-Other) and perspective-shift trial conditions illustrated in the lower 
panels (Other-Self and Self-Other), for Probe-Question Locked ERPs. 
 
Probe-Answer Locked ERPs 
A significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type was present from 350 – 
500ms and 600 – 750ms after the presentation of the answer options across frontal-lateral areas, Fs 
(1, 33) ≥ 4.32, ps ≤ .046, ƞp2s ≥ .12 (see Table 3 for details). This significant interaction was due to a 
larger difference in amplitude between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ oriented probes in No-Perspective Shift 
conditions (0.47 μV) than in Perspective-Shift conditions (-0.23 μV). Figure 4 illustrates this effect. 
A significant three-way interaction between Hemisphere, Perspective Shifting, and Probe Type was 
seen across parieto/occipito-lateral areas from 500 – 750 ms, Fs (1, 33) ≥ 4.36, ps ≤ .045, ηp2s ≥ .12 
(see also Table 3). This was due to the significant interaction between Perspective Shifting and Probe 
Type being present only in the right hemisphere, but not in the left hemisphere (see Figures 4 and 
5). 
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Figure 4: To show the significant Hemisphere*Shift*Probe interaction, ERP Waveforms are 
presented for the left hemisphere (left panels; electrode PO7) and separately for the right 
hemisphere (right panels; electrode PO8), with no perspective-shift trial conditions illustrated in the 
upper panels (Self-Self and Other-Other) and perspective-shift trial conditions illustrated in the lower 
panels (Other-Self and Self-Other), for Probe-Answer Locked ERPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Spline maps depicting the topographical distribution of the differences in amplitude [μV] 
for the Shift*Probe Interaction [(Self-Other minus Other-Self) minus (Other-Other minus Self-Self)], 
and the Hemisphere*Shift*Probe Interaction. These maps illustrate the spatial distribution of the 
interaction effect between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type, for the Probe-Answer Locked ERPs. 
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 Table 2: Probe Question-locked ERP analysis: Presentation of F values following Repeated-Measures ANOVAs of ERP Amplitude for the four pre-defined 
regions of interest. Note that, in an attempt to reduce the possibility of Type 1 errors, only results involving an interaction between Shift and Probe are 
reported here and only effects which were significant for three consecutive time windows were considered stable effects (see analysis section).   
 
 
Time from Onset of Probe Question in ms 
 
150-200 200-250 250-300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500 500-550 550-600 600-650 650-700 700-750 
Fronto-Central Areas 
Shift*Probe 1.65 1.51 2.36 2.88(*) 2.08 1.73 3.81(*) 4.40* 6.99* 8.44** 8.35** 4.84* 
Shift*Contents*Probe 2.02 1.15 4.69* 3.82(*) 2.83 1.73 0.72 1.41 2.17 1.28 0.06 0.65 
Parieto-Central Areas 
Shift*Probe 1.56 11.37** 2.13 1.76 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.36 1.68 1.15 
Shift*Contents*Probe 0.08 0.22 0.33 0.68 0.03 0.44 0.82 1.49 1.29 0.82 1.85 0.44 
Fronto-Lateral Areas 
Shift*Probe       0.00 0.21 0.36 0.07 0.13 0.21 1.28 1.89 2.09 2.24(*) 5.96* 3.76(*) 
Hemi*Shift*Probe       0.72 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.15 0.68 0.03 1.25 0.51 0.38 0.29 1.14 
Shift*Contents*Probe       0.17 1.61 1.13 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.46 1.04 0.31 0.18 0.43 0.08 
Hemi*Shift*Contents* Probe       1.11 0.25 0.40 3.38(*) 2.29 3.95(*) 2.38 1.63 1.64 1.90 4.97* 3.88(*) 
Parieto/Occipito-Lateral Areas 
Shift*Probe 0.39 9.99** 0.44 1.82 0.39 0.02 1.68 3.60(*) 2.98(*) 5.88* 8.39** 3.41(*) 
Hemi*Shift*Probe 3.44(*) 4.01(*) 4.60* 4.17* 9.01** 8.25** 6.20* 0.40 2.02 1.72 2.61 2.52 
Shift*Contents*Probe 0.16 2.15 1.00 0.44 1.69 1.08 1.52 0.87 1.91 0.38 1.61 0.90 
Hemi*Shift*Contents*Probe 0.57 1.20 0.72 0.69 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.88 
(*) p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01  
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Table 3: Probe Answer-Options-locked ERP analysis: Presentation of F values following Repeated-Measures ANOVAs of ERP Amplitude for the four pre-
defined regions of interest. Note that, in an attempt to reduce the possibility of Type 1 errors, only results involving an interaction between Shift and 
Probe are reported here and only effects which were significant for three consecutive time windows were considered stable effects (see analysis section).   
 
 
Time from Onset of Probe Answer Options in ms 
 
150-200 200-250 250-300 300-350 350-400 400-450 450-500 500-550 550-600 600-650 650-700 700-750 
Fronto-Central Areas 
Shift*Probe      0.06 1.49 0.31 2.83 1.44  2.10 (*)     4.36* 0.88 0.98 1.21 3.27 (*) 2.05 
Shift*Contents*Probe      0.10 0.46 0.01 1.23 0.24  0.26      0.01 0.75 3.22 (*) 4.49* 0.83 0.85 
Parieto-Central Areas 
Shift*Probe       0.51 2.08 0.13 0.01 0.03  0.88      0.61 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.06 
Shift*Contents*Probe       0.08 0.41 0.02 2.53 1.38 3.14 (*)      0.37 0.55 0.12 0.00 0.27 0.01 
Fronto-Lateral Areas 
Shift*Probe 1.37  0.01  1.41 1.70 4.32* 4.84* 4.52* 3.65 (*) 1.83 4.68* 5.79* 4.72* 
Hemi*Shift*Probe 0.00  0.08  0.40 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.14 
Shift*Contents*Probe 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.03 0.89 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.44 0.36 
Hemi*Shift*Contents* Probe 0.39  0.00  0.48 0.13 0.03 0.32 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.42 0.22 0.26 
Parieto/Occipito-Lateral Areas 
Shift*Probe 3.97(*) 0.02 2.05 0.27 3.27(*) 1.64 1.69 2.22 1.45 2.21 2.17 3.82(*) 
Hemi*Shift*Probe 1.83 4.74* 1.93 0.77 3.39(*) 3.18(*) 3.00(*) 4.64* 4.36* 3.36(*) 5.08* 3.75(*) 
Shift*Contents*Probe 0.05 0.47 1.11 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.38 2.19 6.30 1.73 1.58 
Hemi*Shift*Contents*Probe 1.78 3.46(*) 2.43 3.92(*) 0.64 0.71 0.39 1.53 1.19 0.21 0.00 0.07 
(*) p < .10; * p < .05; **p < .01  
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DISCUSSION 
This study utilized a matched-design false-belief task to allow direct comparison of ‘Self-Oriented’ 
and ‘Other-Oriented’ belief-attribution processes in ToM, as well as the role of Perspective-Shifting, 
at both a behavioural and electrophysiological level. The results of this study showed a distinct 
behavioural differentiation between the processes required for attribution of beliefs to oneself and 
other-people, with self-oriented belief attribution appearing to be much more efficient and 
successful (faster and less error prone) than other-oriented belief-attribution. Results also revealed a 
specific effect of ‘Perspective-Shifting’ in both behavioural outcomes and in the neurophysiological 
processes underlying this ability; trials in which no-perspective-shift was required were faster and 
more accurate than trials in which a perspective-shift was required. Critically, the type of 
perspective-shift required in a trial had a significant effect on responses; when a trial required a shift 
from Self-to-Other across the dilemma-to-probe, responses were significantly slower and more error 
prone than when a trial shifted from Other-to-Self. These behavioural effects replicate recent 
behavioural findings using the Self/Other Differentiation task (Bradford et al., 2015). The ERP results 
supported this perspective-shifting effect, suggesting a possible neurophysiological basis for the 
behavioural differences established; results showed that from 500ms post stimulus presentation a 
significant effect of Perspective-Shifting, interacting with Probe Type, was seen across fronto-central 
(probe-question locked ERPs) and fronto-lateral (probe-answer locked ERPs) areas. Additionally, a 
stable and consistent early-onset effect of a three-way interaction between Perspective-Shifting, 
Probe Type, and Hemisphere was seen from 250ms post stimulus presentation, suggesting 
lateralisation of these effects, with the critical Perspective-Shift x Probe Type interaction only being 
present in the right hemisphere. Results of the current study suggest that, supporting prior research, 
areas across both frontal and parietal areas of the brain may form core components of the ToM 
‘network’, working together to engage in ToM processes, and playing an important role in 
coordination of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ perspectives. 
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The results of this study support prior literature that suggests that one’s own mental states may be 
processed separately from computation and assessment of the mental states of other people (e.g., 
Frith & Frith, 2003; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Perner et al., 2006). It appears that self-oriented and other-
oriented belief-attribution may recruit separable and distinguishable processes, albeit likely with 
some overlap between them. In line with Vogeley et al. (2001) and Epley et al. (2004), the current 
results also indicate that the ‘Self’ perspective may form the prerequisite stem for understanding the 
perspectives of ‘Others’. In Self-to-Other switch trials, priming of ‘Self’ at the dilemma stage meant 
that the ‘Other’ perspective was not computed until explicitly required (probe stage), increasing 
response times and the likelihood of making errors. In contrast, in Other-to-Self switch trials, 
participants efficiently (faster and more accurately) switched from the primed ‘other’ perspective to 
the ‘self’ perspective, suggesting that the ‘self’ may have been processed as a way of understanding 
the ‘other’. Thus, the ‘other-perspective’ is processed only when explicitly required, whilst the ‘self-
perspective’ is processed regardless of ultimate task demands. Further supporting this, in no 
perspective-shift trials, there was no significant difference in response times or error rates to either 
‘Self’ or ‘Other’ oriented probe questions. The perspective primed at the dilemma stage was upheld 
at the probe stage, allowing preparation of responses, maintained across a trial. These findings 
indicate a specific performance effect of perspective-shifting, as also indicated by Ferguson et al. 
(2017) and Samson et al. (2010), and are further supported by the significant interaction between 
Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type revealed in our ERP analysis. 
Analysis of ERP results was time-locked to two separate stimulus-onset points: the onset of the 
probe-question, and the onset of the probe answer-option images. Results from the ERPs time-
locked to the probe question presentation demonstrated an early onset three-way interaction 
between Perspective-Shifting, Probe Type, and Hemisphere, first seen from 250ms post-stimulus 
onset, across parieto/occipito-lateral areas. Additionally, a two-way interaction between 
Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type was seen from 500ms post-stimulus presentation, maximal over 
fronto-central areas of the brain. Results from the ERPs time-locked to the probe answer-options 
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presentation highlighted a significant two-way interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe 
Type from 350ms post-stimulus onset, across fronto-lateral areas, with a significant three-way 
interaction between Perspective-Shifting, Probe Type and Hemisphere seen across parieto/occipito-
lateral areas, from 500ms post-stimulus onset (probe answer-options). These results are in line with 
prior research that has indicated the importance of both frontal regions and parietal regions in 
processing of ToM (e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003; Happé, 2003; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000; Saxe & Wexler, 
2005; Gallagher et al., 2000; Schurz et al., 2014).  Results indicate that the requirement of shifting 
between perspectives, and the direction of this shift – orienting to the ‘self’ or ‘other’ perspective – 
is processed at a relatively early onset and, critically, that this consideration continues to be 
processed until the resolution of a trial.  
The current results suggest that, in a ToM task requiring participants to attribute beliefs to both 
themselves and other people, key neural activity can be seen across a network of regions, including 
frontal-lateral and parieto/occipito-lateral regions. Previous research has indicated that this 
network, including the anterior cingulate cortex, the pre-frontal cortex, and the right temporal 
parietal junction, may play key roles in managing and reconciling contrasting perspectives, as well as 
being involved in switching between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ perspectives (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; McCleery et al., 2011; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014). It could be suggested that in the current study, ERP activation 
found over frontal areas may reflect activation of the prefrontal cortex, due to the need to process 
conflicting perspectives of the self and other, and consideration of whether a need for a switch in 
perspective is required to successfully resolve and answer a given probe-perspective question (e.g. 
Gobbini et al., 2007; Gallagher et al., 2000; Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2006; Samson et al., 
2005). The results of the current study revealed a three-way interaction between Perspective-
Shifting, Probe-Type and Hemisphere, which may be indicative of the processing required to adapt 
to the necessary perspective prompted, and to adopt the relevant perspective for successfully 
answering the probe question, with activity localised to the right hemisphere (e.g. Saxe & Powell, 
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2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; McCleery et al., 2011; Schurz et al., 2014; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Prior 
studies have suggested brain areas, such as the temporo-parietal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex, may be required for the disengagement of the ‘Self’ perspective and the adoption of the 
‘Other’ perspective, supporting the current findings (e.g. Happé, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014; McCleery 
et al., 2011; Gobbini et al., 2007); however, due to the limited spatial resolution of ERP measures, 
identification of potential underlying brain areas in the current study are interpreted with caution. 
As discussed, the results of the current research both support and expand on prior literature. Of key 
importance, this study allowed direct comparison of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ oriented belief-attribution 
processes, as well as the process of shifting between these two perspectives, at a behavioural and 
electrophysiological level. The use of ERP measures allowed exploratory examination of broad 
measures of neural activity associated with the behavioural effects ascertained, and the time-course 
of these effects. Results revealed a key role of perspective-shifting, interacting with both probe type 
and hemisphere, over frontal-lateral and parieto/occipito-lateral areas, supporting prior research 
findings that have implicated, for example, the temporo-parietal junction and the anterior cingulate 
cortex as playing prominent roles in ToM processes (e.g. Happé, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; 
Gobbini et al., 2007; Saxe & Wexler, 2005; Vogeley et al., 2001; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). These 
results highlight some key focus areas for further exploration, to assess the independent, individual 
roles differential neural components may be playing in ToM expression. One of the key 
manipulations in the Self/Other Differentiation task was the creation of matched-trials, in which the 
answer to either self-oriented or other-oriented belief attribution trials was the same (i.e. both ‘Self’ 
and ‘Other’ believe there to be sugar in the sugar jar). In this way, any differentiation in the neural 
activity associated with self-oriented, other-oriented and perspective-shift trials appears to reflect 
the processes undertaken to adopt a specific perspective, or to engage, maintain or switch to a 
required perspective, rather than reflecting calculations of different solutions to probe questions. 
The solution is the same in both ‘self’ and ‘other’ probe questions, suggesting any calculations 
undertaken reflect alignment to the appropriate response perspective, of either self or other.  
PERSPECTIVE-SHIFTING IN THEORY OF MIND    28 
 
Conclusion 
A key contribution of the current study is the opportunity to directly compare ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
belief-attribution processes, and to examine the specific role of perspective-shifting in ToM 
capacities, using a matched design. Results indicated that ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ belief-attribution 
processes, a key part of the ToM mechanism, can be distinguished at a behavioural level (response-
time/accuracy) within the same task. Crucially, the results provide evidence of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
differentiation processing in the ToM capacity, and the specific role of the process of ‘Perspective-
Shifting’, at both a behavioural and neural (ERP measures) level. Perspective-shifting is hypothesized 
to play a key role in everyday interaction and communication, when decisions about what to say or 
how to act must frequently take into account the contrast between what others know and what we 
ourselves know. The interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type was found over both 
frontal-lateral and right parieto/occipito-lateral areas, suggesting a possible role of the involved 
brain areas in the assessment and calculation of whether it is necessary to adopt the ‘Self’ or ‘Other’ 
perspective. The right lateralization of the parieto/occipito-lateral effect also suggests a potentially 
specific role in ToM processing, and is supported by prior research that has indicated, for instance, 
the role of the right temporo-parietal junction in ToM engagement (e.g. Saxe & Powell, 2006; 
McCleery et al., 2011; Schurz et al., 2014). The current task provides some indication of the more 
specific role that these components may be playing in ToM processing, such as the explicit role of 
perspective-shifting, as well as that of differentiating between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Our results, 
obtained with a typically developed, healthy adult population, provide the opportunity for further 
study into how these processes unfold during ToM development and how they may atypically 
develop in conditions such as autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Brent et al., 2004). 
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